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Abstract:   The   extant   perspectives   on   vote-­‐‑buying   have   produced   three   central  
arguments   around   its   causes,  which   are   the   factors   of   poverty,   the   electoral/voting  
system,  and  the  nature  of  politics  in  the  state.  Going  beyond  these  perspectives,  this  
study  presents   the  argument   that  vote-­‐‑buying  can  also  be  explained  by  considering  
the   nature   of   the   political   economy   of   a   state,   especially   when   the   state   is   oil-­‐‑
dependent.   The   Nigerian   case   study   demonstrates   this   argument.   We   employ   the  
“oil-­‐‑impedes-­‐‑democracy”  framework,  which  is  a  strand  of  the  resource  curse  theory,  
to   argue   that   the   incidence   of   vote-­‐‑buying   in   Nigeria’s   contemporary   elections   is  
prevalent  because  of  the  oil  wealth  associated  with  politics  and  elections  in  the  state.  
This  is  because  abundant  oil  wealth  intensifies  elite  competition,  which  explains  the  
use  of  all  strategies  to  win  elections  including  vote-­‐‑buying.  This  is  also  facilitated  by  
the  fact   that   the  political  elite,  especially  the   incumbent,  have  adequate  access   to  oil  
wealth  and  spend  it  to  “buy”  elections  and  hold  on  power.  Voters,  on  their  part,  also  
prefer  to  sell  their  votes  during  elections  to  have  a  share  of  the  “national  cake”  given  
their  perception  of  the  wealth  associated  with  politics  in  Nigeria  and  the  poor  service  
delivery  by  politicians  after  assuming  state  offices.      
Introduction 
“[In  Nigeria],  political  parties  budget  to  bribe  security  and  INEC  officials.  This  is  a  very  
serious  challenge  to  our  democracy.”  
The  above  remark  was  made  by  Attahiru  Jega,  the  current  chairman  of  Nigeria’s  electoral  
body,  the  Independent  National  Electoral  Commission  (INEC),  to  lament  the  sorry  state  of  
elections  in  that  country.1  This  revealing  statement  corroborates  the  many  narratives  of  
fraud  and  malpractice  in  the  successive  elections  held  in  Nigeria  since  its  return  to  
democracy  in  1999.  Clearly,  a  significant  part  of  the  problem  with  Nigeria’s  electoral  
process,  especially  in  light  of  Jega’s  statement,  has  been  the  prevailing  incidence  of  vote-­‐‑
buying  (exchange  of  cash  or  gifts  for  votes),  which  has  almost  become  a  norm  during  
elections.  Indeed,  vote-­‐‑buying  in  its  different  dimensions  has  been  a  common  and  recurring  
feature  in  the  reports  of  observers  on  Nigeria’s  elections.  The  reports  are  usually  
characterized  by  statements  such  as:  “a  politician…was  alleged  by  voters  to  have  distributed  
money  to  people  who  queued  to  vote  as  well  as  electoral  and  security  officials  at  a  polling  
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station.”2  A  number  of  empirical  studies  have  also  demonstrated  the  prevalence  of  vote-­‐‑
buying  in  the  Nigerian  elections.3  For  example,  a  2007  survey  conducted  by  the  International  
Foundation  for  Electoral  Systems  (IFES)  and  Practical  Sampling  International  shows  “that  
more  than  seven  out  of  ten  Nigerians  believe  that  vote-­‐‑buying  happens  either  ‘all  of  the  
time’  or  ‘most  of  the  time’  in  the  country’s  elections.”4  
A  close  observation  of  the  phenomenon  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  Nigeria  suggests  its  potential  
to  enrich  the  existing  literature  on  vote-­‐‑buying  and  electoral  fraud.  Existing  theoretical  
perspectives  have  only  produced  three  dominant  arguments  to  explain  the  foundations  of  
vote-­‐‑buying  in  elections.  First,  it  is  argued  that  socio-­‐‑economic  factors,  especially  poverty,  
unemployment,  and  illiteracy,  play  a  major  role  in  promoting  the  market  for  votes  in  
democracies.5  Second,  it  is  argued  that  the  voting  methods  in  a  particular  electoral  system  
may  also  guarantee  the  predominance  of  vote-­‐‑buying  during  elections.6  The  third  
explanation  is  predicated  upon  the  belief  that  vote-­‐‑buying  is  a  product  of  the  nature  of  
partisanship  and  party  organization  in  a  particular  state.7  What  is  however  uncommon  in  
the  literature  is  an  understanding  of  the  incidence  of  vote-­‐‑buying  from  the  lens  of  the  
political  economy  of  a  state.  It  was  only  in  2011  that  a  useful  study  by  Pedro  Vicente  
surfaced,  which  establishes  a  connection  between  vote-­‐‑buying  and  an  oil-­‐‑dependent  
economy  with  the  case  of  Sao-­‐‑Tome  and  Principe.8  This  particular  study  was  a  follow-­‐‑up  to  
his  earlier  research,  which  discovered  a  notorious  rise  in  corruption  following  the  discovery  
of  oil  in  that  small  West  African  country.9    
The  present  study  aims  to  contribute  to  the  argument  on  the  relationship  between  oil-­‐‑
dependent  state  and  vote-­‐‑buying  with  the  illustration  of  the  Nigerian  case  study.  It  is  no  
news  that  Nigeria  is  an  oil-­‐‑rich  and  oil-­‐‑dependent  state.  It  is  currently  the  largest  oil  exporter  
in  Africa  given  its  production  of  2.525  million  barrels  of  crude  oil  per  day,  and  its  
contribution  of  2.7  percent  supply  to  the  world’s  oil  market.10  Furthermore,  oil  has  been  a  
major  source  of  the  country’s  revenue,  currently  accounting  for  70  percent  of  its  total  
revenues.  While  vote-­‐‑buying  has  been  observed  as  a  common  occurrence  in  oil-­‐‑dependent  
Nigeria,  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  systematic  study  that  has  demonstrated  a  possible  link  
between  oil  wealth  and  vote-­‐‑buying  in  the  country.  The  oil  wealth  phenomenon  in  Nigeria  
has  been  more  popularly  employed  as  an  analytical  framework  to  explain  resource  conflict  
in  the  Niger  Delta  region,  revenue  allocation  politics  and  conflicts,  and  corruption  and  
underdevelopment  in  the  country.11  
Our  study  works  within  the  framework  of  the  resource  curse  theory  with  special  
emphasis  on  its  “oil-­‐‑impedes-­‐‑democracy”  strand.  The  study  argues  that  the  predominance  
of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  Nigerian  elections  reflects  the  nature  of  politics  and  elections  produced  by  
its  oil-­‐‑dependent  economy.  Nigerian  politics  constitute  a  highly  and  fiercely  contested  
process  among  the  elite  given  the  fact  that  the  control  of  state  power  is  clearly  equivalent  to  
direct  access  to  the  state’s  oil  riches.  It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  elections  are  overly  
monetized  as  politicians  heavily  spend  oil  money  on  elections,  especially  on  vote-­‐‑buying,  in  
order  to  have  (or  continue  to  have)  a  strong  hold  on  power.  For  their  part,  voters  also  
willingly  offer  to  sell  their  votes  given  their  belief  of  receiving  a  share  of  the  national  oil  
wealth.  We  attempt  a  validation  of  this  hypothesis  by  illustrating  contemporary  issues  
around  the  political  economy  of  Nigeria  and  the  electoral  process  since  democracy  returned  
to  the  country  in  1999.  Within  these  parameters,  we  further  present  empirical  evidence  from  
a  fieldwork  conducted  on  electoral  fraud  in  Ekiti  State  in  south-­‐‑western  Nigeria,  which  
provides  more  support  for  our  argument  on  vote-­‐‑buying  in  Nigerian  elections.    
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The  article  is  structured  as  follows.  The  first  section  provides  a  review  of  the  theoretical  
perspectives  on  the  relationship  between  oil  and  democracy,  presenting  the  extent  and  
dimensions  of  the  debate  on  that  topic.  The  second  section  provides  an  explanation  of  the  
tragedy  of  democracy  in  Nigeria’s  oil  economy,  especially  in  contemporary  times.  The  third  
section  provides  an  analysis  of  the  debilitating  consequences  of  oil  wealth  on  the  Nigerian  
elections  in  light  of  the  prevalence  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  the  country.  In  the  fourth  section,  we  
present  empirical  findings  of  the  outcome  of  fieldwork  conducted  in  the  southwest  region  of  
Nigeria.  Finally,  the  fifth  section  provides  a  summary  and  conclusion.      
Oil  Wealth  and  Democracy:  Theoretical  Perspectives  
The  “oil-­‐‑impedes-­‐‑democracy”  perspective  represents  a  major  component  of  the  resource  
curse  theory.  Its  proponents  are  chiefly  of  the  position  that  dependence  on  natural  resources  
(oil  in  particular)  not  only  undermines  growth  and  development  in  a  state  but  also  
negatively  affects  its  democratic  processes.  With  illustrations  from  many  oil-­‐‑rich  Middle  
East  and  African  states,  the  arguments  of  its  proponents  are  centered  on  the  idea  that  oil  
wealth  sustains  autocracy,  and  thereby  frustrates  democratic  transition  and  consolidation.  
This  thesis  is  mostly  anchored  on  the  concept  of  “rentierism”  in  oil-­‐‑dependent  states.12  
Rentierism  is  symptomatic  of  a  state  with  over-­‐‑reliance  on  revenues  from  external  rents  on  
natural  (oil)  resources  and  where  the  government  is  the  principal  recipient  of  the  rent,  which  
permits  the  control  of  the  economy  by  a  few  political  elites.  In  addition,  the  state  operates  an  
economy  where  only  a  few  create  the  wealth,  while  the  majority  only  engages  in  its  
distribution  and  utilization.13  As  a  result,  rentierism  is  argued  to  have  negative  influence  on  
democracy  for  the  following  four  reasons:  taxation,  spending,  social  structure,  and  external  
support.  14    
The  proponents  of  the  taxation  factor  suggest  that  rentier  governments  may  
strategically  use  oil  proceeds  to  either  eliminate  or  reduce  the  tax  burden  on  their  citizens  
and  hence  occasioning  limited  pressures  for  accountability  and  democratization.15  Studies  
have  observed  this  phenomenon  in  many  oil  rich  countries  including  Kuwait,  Qatar,  Jordan,  
and  a  host  of  other  Arab  countries.16  The  second  argument,  the  spending  factor,  indicates  
that  enormous  wealth  from  oil  resources  increases  the  capacity  of  the  government  in  rentier  
states  to  spend  excessively  on  patronage  and  to  continue  to  have  a  hold  on  power.17  In  
addition,  governments  have  the  capacity  to  spend  heavily  on  internal  security  with  the  aim  
of  repressing  domestic  demands  for  democratization  and  the  formation  of  interest  groups  
that  could  call  for  democratic  transition.18  The  social  structure  argument  suggests  that  
rentierism  limits  the  possibility  of  the  emergence  of  a  social  class  that  could  possess  the  
capacity  to  oppose  the  status  quo.  This  is  against  the  backdrop  that  the  middle  class  created  
in  oil-­‐‑dependent  states  lacks  independence  from  the  government,  and  eliminates  the  chances  
for  an  effective  labor  class  because  rentier  states  often  discourage  sustainable  
industrialization.19  The  external  support  thesis  is  derived  from  the  work  of  Gregory  White  
and  Scott  Taylor  based  on  Nigerian  and  Algerian  case  studies.  They  argue  that  “key  actors  
in  the  international  arena—notably,  former  colonial  powers,  international  financial  
institutions  and  transnational  corporations—are  inclined  to  undemocratic,  military  regimes  
that  supply  oil,  while  simultaneously  offering  rhetorical  support  for  ongoing  transitions.”20  
As  presented  above,  the  oil-­‐‑impedes-­‐‑democracy  perspective  in  its  current  forms  focuses  
more  on  the  connection  between  oil  dependence  and  authoritarianism.  Furthermore,  it  offers  
a  theoretical  explanation  of  challenges  to  democratic  transition  because  of  the  oil  factor.  Yet,  
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it  is  scarce  within  this  theoretical  framework  to  find  a  reasonable  consideration  of  the  
consequences  of  oil  resources  on  existing  democracies,  especially  for  democratic  
consolidation.  However,  the  work  of  Jenson  and  Wantchekon  on  this  subject  is  exceptional.21  
These  two  scholars  advanced  the  position  that  oil  wealth  has  the  possibility  of  negatively  
affecting  democratic  consolidation.  This  especially  occurs  in  a  democracy  where  the  state  is  
weak,  allowing  for  incumbent  politicians  to  control  and  distribute  oil  rents,  and  encouraging  
the  promotion  of  patron-­‐‑client  networks.  In  this  situation,  elite  competition  for  state  power  
is  extremely  intense  which  may  lead  to  democratic  breakdown.22  We  find  this  postulation  
particularly  instructive  for  this  study.  We  present  the  argument  that  democratic  
development  in  Nigeria  is  impeded  because  of  its  oil-­‐‑dependent  nature.  A  major  reason  for  
this  is  the  immense  wealth  associated  with  state  power  in  Nigeria  because  of  the  influence  of  
incumbents  on  oil  wealth,  which  intensifies  elite  competition.  This  process  creates  a  
seriously  contested  electoral  process  where  the  political  elite  employed  all  strategies,  
including  violence  and  fraud.  In  this  instance,  vote-­‐‑buying  becomes  one  of  the  major  
winning  strategies,  which  is  facilitated  by  their  access  and  control  of  the  state’s  oil  wealth.  In  
addition,  voters  characteristically  sell  their  votes  given  their  perception  of  the  oil  riches  
associated  with  politics  in  the  country.    
Oil  Curse  and  Democracy  in  Nigeria  
Although  oil  resources  have  been  a  component  of  the  Nigerian  economy  since  the  1950s,  it  
was  certainly  in  the  period  of  the  1970s  oil  boom  (occasioned  by  the  world  oil  crisis  in  1973)  
that  the  state  fully  developed  the  traits  of  renterism  given  the  massive  oil  earnings  it  realized  
during  the  period,  and  of  course,  the  increased  state  control  of  the  oil  industry.  Oil  revenues  
rose  sharply  from  ₦4,733  billion  to  ₦15,234  billion  by  1980  (an  estimate  of  about  222  percent  
increase.)23  These  huge  earnings  increasingly  occasioned  over  dependence  on  oil  resources  
to  the  detriment  of  other  revenue  sources,  especially  agricultural  exports.  Between  1970  and  
1980,  the  percentage  of  revenues  from  oil  exports  against  the  others  rose  sharply  from  57.6  
percent  to  96.1  percent,  and  it  was  as  high  as  99.2  percent  in  2005.24  The  oil  factor  has  since  
been  a  central  issue  in  all  facets  of  the  Nigerian  state  and  society  including  its  democratic  
trajectory.  The  phenomenon  of  oil  wealth  has  indeed  accounted  for  democratic  breakdown,  
frustrated  the  democratic  transition  process,  and  been  a  major  challenge  to  the  path  of  
consolidation  of  the  contemporary  democracy  in  Nigeria.      
Extraordinary  levels  of  corruption  immediately  accompanied  the  influx  of  petrodollars.  
The  first  democratic  regime  in  the  era  of  the  oil  wealth  phenomenon  increasingly  
experienced  the  rise  of  super-­‐‑corrupt  politicians  who  looted  state  resources  with  much  
cruelty  and  impunity.  In  this  regard,  Michael  Watts  noted  that  “Nigeria  ‘lost’  US$16.7  billion  
in  oil  income  owing  to  fraudulent  activities  and  smuggling  of  petroleum  between  1979  and  
1983.”25    It  certainly  became  fashionable  for  politicians  and  civil  servants  to  stuff  stolen  
money  in  Swiss  bank  accounts  and  torch  government  ministries  to  prevent  account  audits.  
This  high  level  of  corruption  greatly  accounted  for  the  Buhari/Idiagbon  military  coup  that  
aimed  at  saving  the  country  from  that  generation  of  political  elite.  Many  high-­‐‑ranking  
politicians  were  prosecuted  following  enough  evidence  of  embezzlement  of  public  funds  at  
the  special  tribunal  established  by  the  military  government  in  1983.26  
A  democratic  transition  as  well  became  arduous  and  almost  impossible  upon  the  
military’s  assumption  of  power,  especially  during  the  regimes  of  Generals  Ibrahim  
Babangida  and  Sani  Abacha.  This  was  largely  the  result  of  the  allure  of  oil  money.  
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Babangida  earned  the  sobriquet  “Maradona,”  as  he  kept  changing  the  timetable  for  the  
democratic  transition.27  At  the  inception  of  his  reign,  he  promised  to  complete  the  transition  
on  1  October  1990  before  it  was  suddenly  postponed  to  1  October  1992.  From  1992,  it  was  
again  deferred  to  2  January  1993  before  Babangida  finally  arrived  at  the  27  August  1993  
date.28  Despite  all  these  changes  and  the  incredibly  expensive  transition  exercise,  the  12  June  
1993  presidential  election  staged  afterwards  was  suddenly  cancelled  by  the  regime  despite  
the  general  claims  of  freeness  and  fairness  in  that  electoral  process.  In  an  attempt  to  truncate  
the  transition  program,  Babangida  spent  huge  amount  of  oil  money  for  patronage  and  to  
find  legitimacy  for  himself;  hence  the  labeling  of  the  regime  as  “government  by  donation.”29  
Many  civil  associations,  such  as  the  Association  for  Better  Nigeria  (ABN),  Committee  of  
Patriots,  Third  Eye,  and  the  Committee  of  Elder  Statesmen,  sprang  up  and  were  sponsored  
by  the  regime  to  frustrate  democratic  transition.30  At  the  end  of  this  regime,  an  investigative  
panel,  otherwise  known  as  the  Pius  Okigbo  Panel  commissioned  in  1994,  discovered  that  
Babangida’s  government  spent  a  total  of  US$12.4  billion  of  the  Gulf  War  oil  windfall  on  
“extra-­‐‑budgetary  expenditures”  that  “neither  the  president  nor  the  Governor  of  the  CBN  
[Central  Bank  of  Nigeria]  accounted  to  anyone.”31      
The  same  story  goes  for  Sani  Abacha’s  military  regime,  which  took  over  power  from  the  
short-­‐‑lived  Interim  National  Government  created  after  the  12  June  1993  political  crisis  
precipitated  by  the  presidential  election.  Contrary  to  Babangida’s  Maradonic  approach,  
Abacha  never  pretended  to  support  a  democratic  transition.  His  aim  was  to  transform  
himself  from  a  military  head  of  state  to  a  civilian  leader  in  the  fashion  of  other  leaders  in  
West  African  countries—Burkina  Faso  (Blaise  Compaoré  in  1991),  Ghana  (Jerry  Rawlings  in  
1992),  Niger  (Ibrahim  Baré  Maïnassara  in  1996),  and  the  Gambia  (Yahyah  Jammeh  in  1996).  
Abacha  was  indeed  fiercer  in  his  own  approach.  With  oil  money  at  his  disposal,  he  spent  
heavily  on  internal  security  to  clamp  down  on  the  opposition.32  Individuals  who  seemingly  
opposed  his  political  ambition  were  assassinated,  detained,  or  forced  into  exile.  On  the  other  
hand,  Abacha  spent  excessively  on  political  mobilization  and  patronage  to  actualize  his  
succession  bid.  All  the  five  parties  registered  for  the  “transition”  exercise  nominated  Abacha  
as  their  presidential  candidate,  making  him  unopposed  for  the  anticipated  election.  Besides,  
many  civil  groups  were  established  solely  to  mobilise  support  for  him.  The  most  prominent  
was  the  Youths  Earnestly  Ask  for  Abacha  (YEAA),  which  organized  a  Two  Million  Man  
March  to  “persuade”  Abacha  to  contest  the  presidency.33  After  Abacha’s  death,  which  
naturally  collapsed  his  authoritarian  regime,  a  series  of  unimaginable  figures  amounting  to  
billions  of  US  dollars  were  reported  to  have  been  stolen  by  Abacha  and  his  family  members.  
Officially,  Obasanjo’s  government  pragmatically  struck  a  deal  with  the  Abacha  family  
whereby  the  government  only  recovered  about  US$1.2  billion  while  the  family  was  left  with  
US$100  million  and  par  bonds  worth  US$300  million.34        
The  post-­‐‑1999  democratic  dispensation  has  also  experienced  serious  challenges  
following  a  series  of  conflicts  around  oil  wealth.  Democracy  ostensibly  opened  up  the  space  
for  the  expression  of  grievances  and  expanded  the  opportunities  for  renegotiation  of  
nationhood,  which  gave  rise  to  increased  agitation  for  resource  control  by  the  peoples  of  the  
oil-­‐‑rich  Niger  Delta.  The  2005  National  Political  Reform  Conference  (NPRC),  therefore,  
created  a  good  platform  to  redraw  the  revenue  allocation  formula  in  which  the  oil-­‐‑
producing  regions  could  be  better  positioned  to  benefit  from  the  allocation  of  oil  wealth  in  
the  country.  The  outright  rejection  by  the  Northern  delegates  of  the  proposed  25  percent  
sharing  formula  on  the  principle  of  derivation  by  the  Niger  Delta  delegates  at  the  conference  
has  since  been  argued  as  a  major  reason  behind  the  transformation  of  peaceful  protests  into  
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violence  in  the  Niger  Delta.  This  is  because  the  event  was  immediately  followed  by  the  
proliferation  of  militant  groups  and  increased  violence  in  the  Niger  Delta  region.35  It  was  
after  the  introduction  of  an  amnesty  offer  for  the  militants  by  the  Umar  Musa  Yar’Adua’s  
government  in  2009,  upon  the  failure  of  a  military  approach,  that  a  “fragile  peace”  has  been  
recorded  in  the  region.36    
While  the  amnesty  policy  was  being  offered  to  the  ex-­‐‑militants  of  Niger  Delta,  there  
emerged  another  notorious  terrorist  group  in  the  northern  region,  the  Boko  Haram  group,  
whose  destructive  activities  are  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  Nigeria.37  Albeit  clamoring  
for  the  Islamization  of  Nigeria,  many  are  of  the  belief  that  the  group  emerged  to  express  its  
grievance  over  marginalization  of  the  northern  peoples  in  response  to  the  existing  structure  
of  allocation  and  spending  of  oil  money  in  the  state.  This  is  especially  in  response  to  the  
huge  amount  of  money  involved  in  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Niger  Delta  ex-­‐‑militants  in  light  
of  the  amnesty  policy  framework.  For  example,  former  Head  of  State  and  prominent  leader  
of  the  opposition  Muhammadu  Buhari  argued:  “What  is  responsible  for  the  security  
situation  in  the  country  [Boko  Haram  terror  activities]  is  caused  by  the  activities  of  Niger  
Delta  militants.”38  As  such,  many  in  the  North  believe  that  amnesty  in  the  fashion  of  that  
offered  to  the  Niger  Delta  militants  should  be  extended  to  the  members  of  Boko  Haram.  In  
fact,  some  northern  political  elites  employed  the  means  of  the  Boko  Haram  crisis  to  resume  
talks  on  the  renegotiation  of  the  terms  for  revenue  allocation  in  the  country.  On  behalf  of  the  
nineteen  governors  in  the  North,  Aliyu  Babangida  (governor  of  Niger  State)  proposed  in  the  
early  days  of  the  Boko  Haram  uprising  in  February  2012  that:  “The  revenue  allocation  
formula  should  be  looked  at.  We  are  hoping  that  within  2012,  there  would  be  discussions  
and  review  of  the  allocation  formula.”39  It  was  against  this  backdrop  that  the  Federal  
Government  offered  to  “appease”  the  north  with  the  payment  of  13  percent  derivation  on  
solid  minerals,  which  was  hitherto  exclusively  enjoyed  by  oil  producing  states.40      
Another  area  that  has  not  received  enough  scholarly  and  empirical  attention  in  
connection  with  Nigeria’s  oil  wealth  and  the  state  of  its  democracy  is  the  implication  of  oil  
wealth  for  the  electoral  process  and  how  this  contributes  to  the  explanation  of  vote-­‐‑buying  
in  contemporary  Nigerian  democracy.  This  is  especially  so  against  the  backdrop  of  the  new  
phenomenon  of  oil  windfall  in  Nigeria  since  the  early  days  of  the  present  democracy,  which  
coincides  with  consistent  increases  in  world  market  oil  prices  until  the  drop  beginning  in  
late  2014.    
Oil  Wealth,  Political  Money,  and  Vote-­‐‑Buying  in  Nigeria  
In  line  with  the  foregoing  section,  the  thesis  advanced  in  this  section  is  that  the  struggle  for  
power  has  been  more  intense  in  the  present  Nigerian  democracy  owing  to  the  attractions  of  
national  wealth  largely  derived  from  oil  and  gas  resources.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  politics,  
especially  elections,  has  not  only  been  a  fierce  process  but  also  an  incredibly  expensive  
venture  in  the  country.  Political  elites  characteristically  use  oil  money  to  fund  elections  and  
buy  votes  from  the  electorate.  As  for  the  voters,  who  are  generally  poor,  an  increasing  
awareness  of  the  huge  money  politicians  amass  in  politics  and  the  poor  service  they  deliver  
upon  their  assumption  into  office  leads  them  to  prefer  selling  their  votes  to  have  a  share  of  
the  ‘”national  cake.”  The  foregoing  statement  supports  the  theoretical  argument  that  “an  
abundance  of  natural  resources  increases  competition  for  the  control  of  the  state,  which  is  
linked  to  high  levels  of  political  violence  and  the  use  of  resource  rents  by  ruling  parties  to  
maintain  their  hold  on  power.”41  In  this  light,  politics  is  rather  “dominated  by  issues  
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concerning  the  distribution  of  oil  rents,  not  ideology.”42  This  process  offers  a  meaningful  
explanation  of  the  prevalence  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  the  country.    
It  is  noteworthy  that  Nigeria’s  earnings  from  oil  sales  quadrupled  following  soaring  oil  
prices  in  the  world  market.  For  instance,  the  country’s  savings  of  surplus  profits  from  crude  
oil  sales  rose  sharply  from  US$5  billion  to  US$20  billion  between  2005  and  2008.43  It  is  for  
this  reason  that  the  government  of  Olusegun  Obasanjo  established  the  Excess  Crude  
Account  (ECA)  in  2004.  According  to  the  Central  Bank  of  Nigeria  (CBN),  ECA  was  
established  “with  the  primary  objective  of  protecting  government  budgets  against  shortfalls  
arising  from  volatile  crude  oil  price.”44  It  was  basically  funded  from  surplus  revenues  
derived  from  crude  oil  sales,  Petroleum  Profit  Tax  (PPT)  and  royalties  above  the  budgeted  
benchmark  of  the  government  for  each  fiscal  year.45  Established  with  this  clearly  stated  
objective,  ECA  has  constituted  one  of  the  major  sources  of  intergovernmental  suspicion  and  
conflict  in  democratic  Nigeria  as  the  political  elite  see  the  account  as  a  goldmine  to  be  
exploited  under  the  guise  of  using  the  money  to  address  budgetary  deficits.      
Shortly  after  the  government  of  Obasanjo  in  2007,  the  thirty-­‐‑six  governors  in  the  
federation  constituted  a  major  political  force  to  pressure  the  federal  government  to  begin  
distribution  of  the  ECA  funds  amongst  the  tiers  of  government  while  declaring  the  account  
unconstitutional.  Following  consistent  pressure,  Yara’Adua’s  government  began  sharing  
money  in  the  account  amongst  the  tiers  of  government.  The  CBN  in  its  2008  annual  report  
reported  that  the  sums  of  ₦841.5  billion,  ₦795.4  billion,  and  ₦77.9  billion,  were  respectively  
withdrawn  at  different  times  from  the  ECA  and  shared  amongst  the  three  tiers  of  
government.46  In  2010,  the  sums  of  ₦450  billion,  ₦873  billion,  ₦502  billion  and  ₦30.5  billion  
were  withdrawn  at  different  times  in  a  similar  manner.47  Under  the  presidency  of  Goodluck  
Jonathan,  reports  show  that  the  following  amount  of  money  has  been  withdrawn  thus  far  
between  2012  and  2013  and  shared  among  the  governments:  February  2012,  ₦187  billion;  
March  2012,  ₦158  billion;  July,  ₦35  billion;  October  2012,  ₦35.5  billion;  November  2012,  
₦35.5  billion;  February  2013,  ₦3.5  billion;  March  2013,  ₦173  billion;  and  April  2013,  ₦  721.5  
billion.48  Against  the  backdrop  of  these  consistent  withdrawals,  there  have  been  consistent  
concerns  by  economists  about  the  wastage  by  the  regimes  and  for  the  country’s  future.  For  
instance,  Oby  Ezekwesili  (former  minister  of  education  and  former  vice-­‐‑president  at  the  
World  Bank)  argued  that:  “The  present  cycle  of  boom  of  the  current  decade  is  much  more  
vexing  than  the  other  four  that  happened  in  the  70s,  80s,  90s  and  2000s.”  She  further  
revealed  that  the  governments  of  Yar’Adua  and  Jonathan  had  squandered  $45  billion  in  
foreign  reserves  and  $22  billion  in  ECA  after  Obasanjo’s  government.49    
The  ECA  phenomenon  provides  one  of  the  many  examples  that  could  demonstrate  the  
rationale  behind  the  “do-­‐‑or-­‐‑die”  philosophy  of  politics  in  Nigeria.  All  strategies,  especially  
fraudulent  ones,  are  characteristically  employed  during  electoral  contests  to  acquire  power  
for  the  distributive  politics  in  the  state.  In  this  process,  the  huge  monies  amassed  by  
government  are,  in  turn,  used  to  fund  and  purchase  elections.  For  example,  the  conflict  
between  former  President  Obasanjo  and  his  vice-­‐‑president,  Atiku  Abubakar,  came  with  the  
revelation  of  how  they  diverted  money  from  the  Petroleum  Technology  Trust  Fund  (PTDF)  
to  fund  their  re-­‐‑election  in  2003,  as  well  as  an  account  of  how  the  former  used  money  from  
the  Fund  to  execute  his  failed  tenure  elongation  ambition  (the  third  term  agenda).  In  another  
instance,  it  was  widely  reported  that  the  governor  of  an  oil-­‐‑rich  state  (James  Ibori)  in  the  
Niger  Delta  region  significantly  funded  Yar’Adua’s  presidential  campaign.  Ibori  was  
popularly  known  as  the  “Oil  Sheikh,”  owing  to  the  stupendous  wealth  he  made  during  his  
tenure  as  the  governor  of  oil-­‐‑rich  Delta  State.  In  April  2012,  he  was  convicted  by  a  United  
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Kingdom  court  for  having  admitted  to  stealing  £50  million  in  state  funds  and  for  other  
related  charges  on  money  laundering.50  Other  politicians  with  little  access  to  state  wealth  or  
“money  bags”  resort  to  selling  their  landed  properties  and  investments  to  fund  elections  
with  the  expectation  that  their  investment  will  be  ‘recouped’  once  they  get  into  power.51    
Consequently,  elections  in  Nigeria  are  among  the  most  expensive  in  the  world.  In  a  
special  report  by  Nick  Thompson  of  CNN  on  international  campaign  finance,  Nigeria  is  
listed  among  the  six  countries  with  the  most  expensive  elections  even  though  clear  data  on  
election  financing  in  the  country  are  not  easily  available.  With  reference  to  Nigerian  
elections,  Magnus  Ohman,  the  Political  Financial  Advisor  for  International  Foundation  for  
Electoral  Systems  (IFES),  remarked:  "ʺIt'ʹs  an  electoral  system  where  you  need  to  spend."ʺ52  
Clearly,  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  huge  finances  associated  with  elections  is  the  special  
budget  used  for  vote-­‐‑buying  by  parties  and  politicians.  For  example,  it  was  widely  reported,  
and  confirmed  by  a  delegate  at  the  People’s  Democratic  Party  (PDP)  January  2011  
presidential  primaries  that  the  sums  of  US$3,000  and  US$10,000  were  budgeted  for  each  
delegate  to  buy  their  votes  by  the  competing  camps  of  Atiku  Abubakar  and  Goodluck  
Jonathan,  respectively,  at  the  primary  election.53  Given  that  8,500  delegates  were  reported  to  
have  attended  the  primaries,  it  can  be  estimated  that  the  Atiku  camp  would  have  spent  
US$25.5  million  while  Jonathan’s  camp  would  have  spent  US$85  million  on  vote-­‐‑buying  
alone  at  the  preliminary  stage  before  the  general  elections.  Interestingly,  Reuters  reported  
that  a  substantial  part  of  the  money  used  by  the  incumbent  was  withdrawn  from  the  
Nigerian  National  Petroleum  Corporation  (NNPC)  account,  which  affected  the  forex  
(foreign  exchange)  market.54  
Besides  the  direct  buy-­‐‑and-­‐‑sell  transaction  as  illustrated  above,  it  is  also  popular  for  
parties  to  bribe  electoral  officers  for  them  to  manipulate  votes  in  their  favor.  In  a  personal  
interview  with  the  researchers,  a  presiding  officer  for  INEC  who  carried  out  his  assignment  
in  Osun  State  in  the  2011  general  elections  narrated  his  experience  in  the  following  
statements:    
Bribery  was  introduced  in  one  form  or  the  other;  financial  gratifications  to  all  
officers  with  the  hope  that  the  presiding  officers  will  be  manipulated  in  their  
favor.  I  can  specifically  speak  of  the  PDP,  a  total  of  ₦1.1  million  were  given  to  
us  at  our  first  meeting.  We  were  told,  “If  they  catch  you,  you  cannot  mention  
us.”…They  wanted  us  to  inflate  the  number  of  accredited  voters.55  
Interestingly,  the  officer  clearly  admitted  to  having  collected  money  from  politicians.  
His  attitude  towards  the  bribe  money  is  quite  consistent  with  our  argument  on  the  general  
attitude  of  Nigerians  with  regards  to  elections  and  politics  because  of  the  oil  factor.  
Nigerians  do  not  necessarily  see  it  as  immoral  to  accept  monetary  offers  from  politicians  in  
exchange  for  votes,  although  they  might  occasionally  defect  at  the  point  of  voting.56  When  
asked  about  his  motivation  for  collecting  the  money,  the  electoral  officer  enthusiastically  
responded  that  
I  am  happy  to  collect  the  money.  Maybe  I  should  tell  you  this:  I  have  spent  30  
years   of  my   life   in   that   country,   I   never   received   anything   substantial   from  
that  country.  If  for  once  in  30  years  I  see  someone  as  being  part  and  parcel  of  
the   ‘national   cake’   offering   me  money,   I   would   be   so   happy   to   collect   the  
money  because  ordinarily  the  money  should  have  been  used  to  provide  basic  
amenities….   I  wish   several   other  youths  had   the  opportunity   to   collect   that  
kind  of  money  from  the  politician.  The  money  was  in  a  ‘Ghana  Must  Go’  bag  
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with  a  CBN  bond  on  it   (₦1000).   It   tells  you:   ‘this  money  is  Nigerian  money,  
spend  it!’....  If  it  happens  over  and  over  again,  I  will  still  collect  the  money.57    
In  the  same  spirit,  the  officer  willingly  offered  to  share  the  experience  of  his  colleague  in  
the  eastern  region.  His  colleague  who  served  in  Owerri  in  Imo  State  told  him  that  no  voting  
took  place  in  his  polling  unit  during  the  presidential  election  because:    
  
…  at  the  INEC  distribution  center,  as  early  as  8am  in  the  morning,  they  told  
them  everyone  had  agreed  that  the  PDP  would  win  the  presidential  election.  
But  for  coming,  you  should  all  [the  presiding  officers]  have  ₦25,000  each.  So  I  
am  not  surprised  at  the  bogus  number  of  votes  in  the  East.58  
Empirical  Data  on  Ekiti  State  Elections,  2007-­‐‑2011  
In  the  classification  of  states  in  Nigeria,  Ekiti  State  in  the  southwestern  region  represents  one  
of  the  states  with  absolute  dependence  on  federal  allocations  (basically  from  the  oil  
wealth).59  This  is  because  the  state  lacks  any  meaningful  alternative  sources  of  revenue  
except  for  the  federal  allocations.  For  example,  the  peer  review  report  of  the  Nigeria  
Governors’  Forum  (NGF)  in  January  2013  indicates  that  the  state’s  capacity  for  internally  
generated  revenue  is  weak.  It  constituted  only  9.8  percent,  7.9  percent,  and  7.6  percent  of  its  
total  revenues,  in  2009,  2010,  and  2011  respectively.60  Thus,  the  economic  life  of  the  state  has  
always  been  more  determined  by  the  “vagaries  of  the  fluctuations  in  world  oil  prices.”61  
Reports  show  that  federal  allocations  to  the  state  constituted  almost  80  percent  of  the  state’s  
revenues  between  2005  and  2007.  This  statistics  excludes  some  other  revenues  from  excess  
crude  sales  at  the  period.62  Given  this  condition,  economic  activities  in  the  state  are  more  
centered  around  the  public  sector.  Many  people  are  engaged  in  the  civil  service  and  teaching  
professions  (in  public  schools).  Worse  still,  the  highland  nature  of  the  geography  of  the  state  
also  does  not  encourage  agriculture,  although  many  of  its  rural  population  engage  in  
farming.63  This  sufficiently  accounts  for  the  high-­‐‑rate  of  poverty  in  the  state.  The  National  
Bureau  of  Statistics  show  that  Ekiti  State  has  the  second  highest  level  of  poverty  in  the  South  
West  Region,  with  a  59.1  percent  figure.64    
The  state’s  economy,  as  presented  above,  occasions  increased  attraction  to  state  power  
because  money  obviously  flows  from  the  corridors  of  the  government.  Politics  has  therefore  
been  a  major  issue  in  the  state  since  its  creation  in  1996.  Certainly,  this  explains  the  
controversies  and  violence  that  have  followed  elections  in  the  state,  especially  the  2007  
gubernatorial  elections  and  their  rerun  in  2009.  Elsewhere  we  have  presented  findings  on  
the  dimensions  of  electoral  fraud  in  the  states  elections.65  In  this  study,  we  present  findings  
on  the  incidence  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  the  state’s  elections  within  the  context  of  the  rentier  
nature  of  the  Nigerian  political  economy.  The  findings  on  the  phenomenon  in  the  state  are  
basically  derived  from  a  series  of  in-­‐‑depth  interviews  (both  personal  interviews  and  focus  
group  discussions)  with  the  categories  of  people  that  surround  the  elections  held  in  the  state  
between  2007  and  2011.  These  categories  include  politicians  (from  the  dominant  parties  in  
the  state),  voters  (basically  youths,  some  under  the  voting  age),  election  observers,  election  
officers,  and  party  thugs.  We  were  able  to  interview  thirty  people  to  elicit  information  from  
them  ostensibly  about  electoral  fraud  in  the  state.  It  was  in  this  process  that  we  were  able  to  
make  sense  of  the  phenomenon  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  the  state’s  elections.  Given  the  sensitivity  
of  the  topic  under  investigation  and  the  manner  of  their  responses,  we  have  deliberately  
kept  the  identity  of  respondents  confidential.    
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Politics  is  “Chop  and  Go”—Politics  is  about  Looting  and  Money  Making  
In  a  series  of  discussions  with  our  interviewees,  it  is  clear  in  their  perception  that  politics  in  
Nigeria  represents  a  viable  means  for  personal  enrichment,  especially  because  it  guarantees  
absolute  access  to  state  money.  In  a  focus  group  discussion  with  youths  who  have  had  
considerable  experience,  as  voters  or  as  party  followers,  in  the  recent  elections  in  the  state,  
the  following  were  some  of  their  responses  when  asked  about  their  understanding  of  politics  
in  Nigeria:      
“Politics   is   chop   and   go.   You   just   have   to   get   there   and   make   your   own  
money   at   the   expense   of   the   masses”;   “Politics   is   a   serious   business.   They  
[politicians]   are   just   there   amassing   wealth   for   themselves   and   their   own  
family”;  “Politics   in  Nigeria   is  a  dirty  business.  Politics   is  about  struggle   for  
power   and   wealth   and   not   in   the   interest   of   the   masses”;   and   “Politics   is  
everything   in   Nigeria.   You  want   to   get   political   power   and   have   access   to  
everything  you  need  in  life.”66  
Given  the  above  manner  of  response,  it  makes  sense  to  argue  that  voters  are  motivated  
to  easily  accept  money  from  politicians  given  their  perception  of  the  abundant  monetary  
benefits  in  politics.  In  addition,  it  could  be  inferred  from  the  narrative  provided  by  a  
politician  that  politics  is  so  important  in  the  state  because  of  the  spoils  it  provides.  In  his  
explanation  of  the  2007/2009  crisis  in  the  gubernatorial  elections  held  in  the  state,  the  
interviewee  narrated  that:  
In  1999,  the  whole  of  southwest  voted  for  AD.  Our  friends  in  the  ruling  party  
were  not  preparing   that   they  will  once  be  out  of  government.  They   thought  
they  will  be  in  government  for  over  ten  years.  Councilors  will  settle  down  in  
a   beer  parlor   and  kill   fresh   fish.  They  were  buying  many  vehicles—Toyota,  
Mercedes   Benz,  Nissan,   just   name   it.   They   never   anticipated   any   economic  
shortfall.  Suddenly,   they   lost   in  2003  but   they   thought  by  2007,   they  will  be  
able  to  reclaim  power.  When  they  lost  again  in  2007,  then  there  was  increased  
aggression  from  them  because  most  of   them  sold  their  properties   to  execute  
the  2007  elections.67  
The  above  narration  clearly  confirms  the  popular  perception  that  politics  is  about  self-­‐‑
enrichment  in  Nigeria.  Certainly,  this  reason  provides  an  explanation  for  the  extent  to  which  
politicians  would  go  in  order  to  acquire  power.  As  mentioned  in  the  interview,  politicians  
spent  excessively  on  the  elections  and  sold  their  properties  in  desperation  for  power.  In  this  
process,  vote-­‐‑buying  becomes  one  of  their  major  spending  on  elections.  The  following  
illustrates  the  many  forms  vote-­‐‑buying  took  in  the  state  elections.    
“Logistics”  
The  gathered  evidence  clearly  indicated  that  political  parties  created  separate  budgets  for  
vote-­‐‑buying  at  electoral  periods  under  the  label  of  “logistics.”  This  revelation  has  earlier  
been  made  by  a  former  governor  of  a  state,  Donald  Duke,  while  giving  a  personal  account  of  
how  governors  rig  elections.68  In  the  case  of  Ekiti  State,  a  party  executive  narrated  that  it  is  
the  normal  practise  for  politicians  to  have  an  all-­‐‑night  meeting  a  day  before  elections  with  
the  purpose  of  strategizing  to  bribe  electoral  officers  and  buy  votes  from  voters.  According  
to  him:    
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…  most  of  the  electoral  officers  will  come  and  collect  money  [at  the  meeting].  
Even  if  you  don’t  call  them,  they  will  come.  I  was  told  it  is  a  normal  practice.  
It  is  called  logistics.  I  was  told  other  parties  have  done  that.  At  the  end  of  the  
day,  we  had  to  give  them  something.  In  fact,  the  money  came  from  the  state.69  
In  addition  to  the  money  provided  to  electoral  officers  prior  to  voting,  there  are  also  
special  monetary  allocations  for  each  polling  booth  in  the  state.  Our  informant  informed  us  
that  the  amount  of  money  allocated  to  each  polling  booth  varies  depending  on  the  
population  and  location  of  each  booth.  “We  budgeted  ₦100,000  for  each  polling  booth,”  he  
stated.  “There  is  money  for  presiding  officers  and  provision  for  security  officers  for  each  
polling  booth.  [In  estimation],  that  is  about  ₦300,000  for  each  polling  booth  and  we  have  
about  177  wards  in  Ekiti.  Each  ward  would  have  about  five  to  six  polling  booths.”70  
“Door-­‐‑to-­‐‑Door  Campaign”    
According  to  an  election  observer  with  the  Justice,  Development  and  Peace  Commission  
(JDPC),  there  is  also  the  method  of  vote-­‐‑buying  popular  among  all  the  political  parties,  
which  is  done  under  the  guise  of  a  “door-­‐‑to-­‐‑door  campaign.”  As  the  term  symbolizes,  
politicians  and  their  agents  move  from  one  house  to  the  other,  ostensibly  to  campaign  and  
solicit  for  votes,  only  to  offer  people  cash  or  other  gift  items  (such  as  tins  of  milk,  clothing  
materials,  detergents,  bags  of  salt,  etc.)  in  anticipation  of  their  votes  at  the  polling  booth.  
Although  old-­‐‑fashioned  in  Nigeria,  the  method  is  apparently  more  favored  because  of  the  
high  rate  of  poverty  in  the  state.  Politicians  see  it  as  a  better  strategy  to  negotiate  with  voters  
at  their  homes  because  of  the  advantage  of  negotiating  with  the  whole  of  the  family,  rather  
than  an  individual  voter  only.  Narrating  his  experience,  a  politician  informed  us  that:  
I  was  telling  my  aunt  to  vote  for  our  party  because  I  helped  her  daughter  to  
get   a   job  when  we  were   in   power.   She   responded   that   the   other   party   has  
done  well   than   our   own   party   because   they   gave   her  ₦2000   as   against   the  
₦500  provided  by  our  own  party.  The  children  were  given  ₦1000  each.71  
“Voter  Card”  
Realizing  the  importance  of  voter  registration  to  elections,  political  parties  pay  potential  
voters  to  register  to  vote  at  the  elections.  In  this  process,  many  people  are  mobilized  in  
preparation  for  the  elections.  A  university  student  informed  us  that:    
There   was   a   time   when   I   was   on   campus,   the   party   came   with   buses   to  
mobilize   students   to   go   and   register.   A   friend   came   to   inform  me   that   the  
president  of   the   town  union  told  him  that  ₦500  will  be  provided  for  people  
willing   to   vote.   I   told   him   about   the   warning   made   by   the   new   INEC  
chairman  on   fraudulent   registration,  but  my   friend   said   I   should   just   forget  
about  that.72  
It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  it  is  not  really  in  the  interest  of  the  parties  to  ensure  that  
the  registered  voters  are  present  on  election  day,  but  what  actually  matters  in  this  instance  is  
the  voter  card.  Someone  else  may  use  the  voter  card  to  cast  a  ballot.  In  such  instances,  there  
are  voter  cards  for  sale  to  candidates  who  are  in  desperate  need  of  votes.  In  the  words  of  one  
of  our  interviewees,  “There  are  politicians  who  have  more  than  fifty  votercards.  They  sell  it  
on  the  day  of  elections.”73    
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“See  and  Buy”  
This  marks  a  new  trend  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  Nigeria.  It  was  introduced  in  the  2011  elections  by  
politicians  to  prevent  defection  by  voters  having  paid  for  their  votes.  Our  informants  
narrated  that  this  came  as  a  new  method  after  politicians  realized  that  voters  in  most  cases  
do  not  comply  after  payment  for  their  votes.  Therefore,  politicians  (in  connivance  with  
electoral  officers)  influence  the  creation  of  congested  polling  centers  that  would  allow  for  
monitoring  of  how  people  vote  regardless  of  the  fact  that  Nigeria  operates  a  secret  ballot  
voting  method.  In  this  regard,  political  thugs  are  hired  and  placed  at  strategic  locations  very  
close  to  ballot  boxes  to  see  which  party  a  voter  has  voted  for  before  payment.  In  the  words  of  
an  election  observer,  “On  election  day,  someone  will  be  watching  the  pattern  of  vote  and  
give  signal  to  another  party  agent  to  pay  at  the  back,  if  the  voter  fails  to  vote  for  the  party,  
there  is  also  a  signal.”74  We  were  also  informed  that  “after  voting,  you  [voters]  will  go  to  the  
queue  and  write  names”  in  order  to  receive  their  payment  after  voting  for  the  party.75    
Conclusion  
The  main  objective  of  this  paper  has  been  to  explain  the  predominance  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  
Nigerian  elections  within  the  context  of  the  oil  dependent  nature  of  the  state.  To  this  end,  we  
demonstrated  that  elite  competition  has  been  fiercer  in  the  current  democracy  in  Nigeria  
given  the  new  age  of  oil  windfall  the  country  has  experienced  in  recent  times.  Politics  has,  
therefore,  been  consistently  driven  by  the  distribution  of  rents  because  of  the  general  
attitudes  towards  elections  by  both  the  elite  and  the  masses.  In  this  process,  the  oil  money  to  
which  the  political  elite,  especially  the  incumbents,  have  abundant  access  has  mostly  shaped  
the  market  of  votes  in  the  country.  To  further  buttress  our  argument,  we  present  evidence  
from  a  fieldwork  conducted  in  a  state  in  the  South  West  Region  that  absolutely  depends  on  
oil  revenue  allocation.  This  structure  of  the  economy  of  the  state  apparently  shaped  the  
character  of  elite  competition  and  the  incidence  of  vote-­‐‑buying  in  the  state’s  elections.  While  
studies  in  the  field  of  economics  and  political  science  have  contributed  immensely  to  the  
resource  curse  theory,  especially  its  relationship  with  democracy,  this  study  has  attempted  
to  offer  a  contribution  to  the  extant  literature  by  employing  the  Nigerian  case  to  argue  that  
oil  resources  constitute  a  potential  variable  for  consideration  in  explaining  the  apparent  
challenges  facing  democracies  in  oil-­‐‑dependent  states,  especially  the  newly  democratized  
ones.  Also  importantly,  this  study  has  proven  to  be  relevant  to  the  existing  literature  on  the  
theoretical  perspectives  on  vote-­‐‑buying.  As  much  as  we  certainly  agree  with  other  scholars  
that  the  factors  of  poverty,  electoral  systems,  and  the  nature  of  politics  are  truly  related  to  
vote-­‐‑buying  in  electoral  systems,  based  on  the  Nigerian  case  we  also  argue  that  the  political  
economy  of  states  also  matter  in  the  discourse  on  the  incidence  of  vote-­‐‑buying.      
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